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Our topic today is the impact of Justice Scalia on the Supreme
Court. There are many different perspectives from which one
might address this issue. I intend to focus on Scalia's
methodology, and to say a little bit about how that methodology
gets applied in particular cases. This will lead into a slightly larger
point about constitutional adjudication more generally, and
Scalia's place in that enterprise. And it will lead to a point about
the current perception of constitutional adjudication, which is
perhaps most important, and Scalia's impact on that.
Justice Scalia's interpretive methodology can largely be
captured by three themes: textualism, originalism, and democracy.
Textualism suggests in statutory cases that we should focus on the
words that are actually law, rather than legislative history such as
committee reports, and in constitutional cases that we should heed
the words of the Constitution rather than considerations not found
in the document itself. Originalism suggests that in seeking to
understand the words of the Constitution we should ask how they
were understood at the time they were written, not what modem
readers might think. And his commitment to democracy means
that he believes most substantive value choices-those not
addressed directly by the text of the Constitution-are to be left up
to the political process. The role of the Court, Scalia said in his
dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, is not to take sides in the
culture wars but to assure, as a "neutral observer, that the
democratic rules of engagement are observed."
Of these three themes, the commitment to democracy is
perhaps the most important. Both textualism and originalism can
be seen as means to support democracy, because they constrain
judges and thereby prevent them from imposing their own values
on the people. Judges simply ensure that the choices the people
make are made through a functional democratic process.
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I am going to say some things that may sound like criticisms of
Scalia, but I have very little in the way of criticism of this model of
adjudication. Textualism makes good sense. What, after all, is the
point of a written constitution if judges are free to ignore its
words? And originalism makes sense as well-if we follow the
current understanding of particular words rather than the Framers'
understanding, linguistic changes could lead us to different
constitutional results more or less randomly. The word "refute,"
for instance, is now increasing used to mean "rebut" rather than to
demonstrate falsity, that is, to rebut successfully. A constitutional
provision that requires refutation should not come to require only
rebuttal simply because modem speakers are careless of the
difference.
Unsophisticated originalism, which you will frequently
encounter, does have some problems. Originalists tend to focus
almost exclusively on the framing of the original constitution.
This is a serious mistake because it gives inadequate weight to the
remarkable transformation of our constitution wrought by the
Reconstruction Amendments. So our constitutional law and theory
should pay much more attention to John Bingham than it does, and
perhaps less to James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.
Second, many originalists seem to ignore the possibility that
the Constitution was originally understood to contain some
provisions that took their meaning from social context. A
provision directing senators to dress in "the latest fashions" would
certainly not now be understood to call for wigs or knee breeches,
nor should it be. The same might be true of other constitutional
provisions, of which "cruel and unusual punishment" is perhaps
the most obvious, but not the only, example. Allowing the content
of some constitutional norms to evolve may be quite consistent
with the original understanding. So originalists make mistakes and
overstate their claims, but originalism in general is something I
have no quarrel with.
Last, the desire to promote democracy is perhaps the most
appealing aspect of Scalia's vision. The Constitution is indeed not
a device by which losers in the democratic process can seek
judicial overrides. It is a framework for enduring and democratic
self-govemance, and judges should never lose sight of that facL.
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Having said that I agree, at least in broad terms, with Scalia's
interpretive methodology, do I agree with the results he reaches?
The answer is no, and that leads to the first significant point I want
to make. The methodology I have described does not consistently
produce politically conservative results. Or at least, it need not.
The question, then, is why it does in Scalia's hands, and that's an
issue I'll get to later. But what I want to do now is to demonstrate
that textualism, originalism, and democracy can in fact lead judges
to liberal or progressive outcomes.
Let's start with abortion. Abortion is perhaps the easiest issue
for Scalia. The word abortion is certainly nowhere in the
constitution; nor is privacy, on which Roe v. Wade relied. And the
fact that many states had abortion restrictive laws on the books at
the time the 14th Amendment was ratified suggests that the original
understanding of that Amendment did not include an abortion
right.
So far, so good. But what about democracy? How do the
abortion restrictions on the books at 
the time of the 1 4 th
Amendment, or even Roe v. Wade, look from the democratic
perspective? Not necessarily so good. Women were certainly
underrepresented in the legislatures that enacted those laws.
Indeed, many of the laws affected by Roe v. Wade were enacted
before women were even allowed to vote. So it's far from clear
that they're the outcome of a well-functioning democratic process.
But how far does that critique get us? Does it justify continued
judicial intervention? If you look at the representation of women
in state legislatures, the answer may be yes; if you think the right
to vote is enough, then you might think no. But important though
democracy is, it's not the whole story of American
constitutionalism. Majority rule is an important value, but so too is
equality. Politically powerful groups may oppress the less
powerful, and in fact the Constitution contains equality rules
designed to prevent that-the Equal Protection Clause, and also the
Due Process Clause. The constitutional mandate of equality,
Justice Scalia has said, is our "salvation" from oppressive laws, for
it "requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and
their loved ones what they impose on you and me."
What does equality mean in the context of abortion? A law
that restricts abortion, Justice Scalia has said, restricts an important
liberty. It is permissible, he believes, because it reflects a
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legislative judgment that life is more important than liberty. That
is the kind of value choice that should be left up to the democratic
process.
And that's a fairly plausible thing to say. Many value choices
should be left up to the political process, and judges' role in such
cases, as Justice Scalia would agree, is simply to make sure that
these choices are made in an even-handed fashion. It's okay for a
State to decide that life is more important than liberty. What it
can't do is decide that life is more important than women's liberty
alone-that women can be singled out to bear a burden others need
not.
The equality-focused analysis of abortion is complicated by the
fact that only women get pregnant. If men could get pregnant, I
don't think abortion restrictions would be constitutionally
troubling. And I think it's also almost certain that they wouldn't
exist. But in the world we have, what should a judge concerned
about equality do? Well, one thing to do is to ask whether the
State does ask other people to sacrifice their liberty to promote life.
Does it impose a duty to rescue? Does it require blood donation?
Does it require people to make their organs available to others
upon their death? If the answer is no, as it is in every state in the
union, then one might indeed conclude that the abortion restriction
exists only because the legislature gives less respect to women's
liberty, which the constitution prohibits.
My second example merits only a little discussion. In the so-
called new federalism cases, Justice Scalia has repeatedly joined
majorities, or even written opinions, that have no basis in the text
of the constitution. Can the federal government require state
officials to implement federal legislation? Nothing in the
Constitution says no. Can the federal government authorize
individuals to sue states for money damages? Here there does
seem to be a relevant piece of constitutional text, the 11
th
Amendment, which says that the judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to suits against states by
citizens of other states. This might mean that federal law can't
provide for suits in federal court, though most scholars agree that
this was not the original understanding. But it plainly says nothing
about suits in state court. Yet in Alden v. Maine, Justice S alia
joined the familiar 5-4 majority to hold that such suits were barred
by state sovereign immunity, despite the obvious lack of a textual
[Vol. 8
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol8/iss1/3
JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONSTITUTION
or historical basis for that ruling. Textualism and originalism
would lead to the opposite result here; so too would a plausible
understanding of democracy, for the will of the National people
would be expected to prevail over the will of a State. And indeed,
there's further textual support for that expectation-the Supremacy
Clause, which provides that federal law shall prevail over state
laws and state constitutions.
My last example, and the most important one, concerns equal
protection. And here I want to juxtapose two of Justice Scalia's
positions, one on affirmative action and one on gay rights. With
respect to affirmative action, Scalia believes the matter is clear.
Racial classifications are never permitted, regardless of their
purpose. As he wrote in Croson, "strict scrutiny must be applied to
all governmental classification by race, whether or not its asserted
purpose is 'remedial' or 'benign'."
What about laws that classify on the basis of sexual
orientation? Here Scalia believes that the matter is equally clear:
the Constitution has nothing to say. A Court that strikes down a
Colorado constitutional amendment that stops cities from
forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation has
"mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite." A Court that strikes
down a Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy has "taken sides
in the culture war"--thankfully, we don't get the German this time.
Now, how, as textualists, originalists, and democrats, do we
reconcile these two positions? It would be easy if the Equal
Protection Clause said "no state shall make any distinction based
on race, but distinctions based on sexual orientation are okay."
But of course it doesn't. It simply guarantees the equal protection
of the laws. A textualist doesn't know what to do with that. If you
take it seriously, it might seem to suggest that all differential
treatment is prohibited, but all laws can be described as making
distinctions, so that's not a workable interpretation. If you want to
look at history, history shows that immediately after the ratification
of the 14th Amendment, the very same Congress that drafted it
repeatedly enacted race-conscious remedial legislation. From the
originalist perspective, affirmative action looks okay. Sexual
orientation discrimination is less clear. The text simply doesn't
take us all the way here; we need some kind of theory of what- the
Equal Protection clause is about.
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Does our third desideratum, respect for democracy, offer any
additional resolving power? Yes, it does. As it was initially
understood, the Equal Protection Clause was designed to protect
against invidious discrimination--discrimination intended to
stigmatize or harm a particular class. Post-New Deal Equal
Protection jurisprudence carried that understanding forward and
supplemented it with an analysis focused on the political process.
The kinds of laws that the Equal Protection clause invalidates,
under this analysis, are those that burden minorities historically the
targets of prejudice. And if that's your approach, it's pretty clear
that affirmative action is not constitutionally suspect, but a law that
criminalizes the sexual conduct of gays and lesbians is.
Scalia disagrees, and in fact his five-justice majority has been
responsible for changing Equal Protection jurisprudence from a
doctrine that protects minorities into one that prohibits certain
kinds of classifications, regardless of who's benefited and who's
burdened. That's a possible approach to Equal Protection. I don't
think it's the most sensible, in terms of text, history, and
democracy-I don't think that the white majority needs
constitutional protection from affirmative action-but it's possible.
And this leads to my larger point, which is about the nature of
constitutional adjudication. There's more than one possible
approach to Equal Protection. How does a Justice choose?
History and respect for democracy, I think, favor the approach that
seeks to protect the politically weak, but they don't compel it. In
the end, this comes down to something like a value choice. There
are value choices in constitutional adjudication. Equal Protection
is far from the only example-judges are frequently called upon to
decide whether a governmental action is reasonable or legitimate,
and there is no way to apply those standards except by making a
value-laden judgment.
Thus, different approaches to constitutional adjudication will
promote different values. Let me return to the equal protection
example for just a moment to make this point. In the Romer case,
with which you're probably familiar, the Court struck down a
Colorado constitutional amendment that had barred cities and
towns from including sexual orientation as a protected trait in their
antidiscrimination ordinances. Justice Scalia, of course, dissented.
In that case, the majority said, what Colorado had done was to
systematically disadvantage gays and lesbians in their effort to
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seek legislative protection. All other groups could use the
legislative process to their advantage; gays and lesbians could not.
This is unheard-of, the court said. It is a denial of equal protection
in its most literal sense, and it is inexplicable as anything but
animus.
Well, some of that might be true, but not the unheard-of part.
Because the current approach to equal protection does exactly that.
Think again about affirmative action. Under Justice Scalia's
approach, the Equal Protection clause doesn't protect minorities.
Instead, it prevents the government from using racial
classifications. So what does this mean for university admissions,
or for the distribution of governmental benefits more generally? It
means that almost any group can get preferential treatment.
Alumni children, athletes, flute players, people from different
geographical regions. All of these people can be favored. Who
can't? Racial minorities. Current Equal Protection jurisprudence
prevents racial minorities, and basically no one else, from getting
benefits through the ordinary political process. So there's a pretty
big difference between in the values these different approaches to
equal protection promote.
So what's the larger point? It's that Scalia is wrong to say that
the Constitution doesn't take sides. It does, inevitably. On the
older version of Equal Protection, the constitution took the side of
the politically weak and protected them from majoritarian
oppression. On Scalia's understanding, it takes the side of the
majority and protects them from being asked to make any sacrifice
in the name of racial equality. Neither of these readings is
compelled by the canons of constitutional construction. Each
embodies a value choice.
So Scalia is making value choices. I'm not here to say that that
is illegitimate; indeed, my argument is that it's inevitable. And
I'm not here to say that his values are wrong, either. They aren't
my values. I hope, and I believe, that they aren't America's
values. But in a democracy, putting Bush v. Gore aside, that's a
question for the American people. What I do criticize Scalia for is
not acknowledging that he's making value choices. This failure is
connected to, and is in part no doubt a cause of, the most troubling
aspect of contemporary discourse about constitutional
adjudication.
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This is the final point I want to make. Justice Scalia's refusal
to admit that he is making these choices and his attacks on others
for making them, contribute to a widespread misperception, among
liberals as well as conservatives, that conservative judges adhere
strictly to the Constitution and apply it in the manner in which it
was originally understood, while liberals attempt to import modem
notions of justice.
This dichotomy is a false one. And most of the terms used in
making such characterizations are nonsensical. "Strict
construction," a phrase we sometimes hear in this context, is a
meaningless slogan. As Justice Scalia himself has said, a judge
should get no credit for construing a statute or constitutional
provision either strictly or loosely. What we want, presumably, are
judges who construe these things correctly. And since some
constitutional provisions empower government, while some restrict
it, strict construction does not even have a consistent political
valence. All it has is a specious aura of legitimacy.
The same is true for a more commonly used phrase: "judicial
activism." Judicial activism, popularly understood, consists of the
substitution of a judge's own values for those embodied in the
constitution. Again, however, the term has almost no real content.
There is no judge out there, I can assure you, who understands his
or her own behavior in this way. What there are are judges who
are making the value choices inherent in at least some
constitutional adjudication, more or less honestly, more or less
openly, and with more or less acknowledgement that judging
requires judgment. To call these judges activist is simply a more
rhetorically charged method of registering disagreement with their
values. And again, as I hope my discussion of affirmative action
suggests, it can be done as well to the right as to the left. If judicial
activism means anything, it might mean that judges strike down
laws they should not and thereby thwart the will of a majoritarian
branch of government. But this understanding is not particularly
useful-a judge that lets an unconstitutional law stand has broken
faith with the constitution as much as one that strikes down a
constitutional law. And it does not distinguish right from left, for
the Rehnquist Court has struck down laws as aggressively as any
Court ever has. The Violence Against Women Act, the New
Jersey antidiscrimination law applied to the Boy Scouts' policy of
excluding gays, the Americans with Disabilities and Age
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Discrimination in Employment Acts as applied to the states. This
is not a restrained Court.
There simply is not a difference in kind between liberal and
conservative constitutional adjudication. What there is, is a
difference in values. What values the Justices of the Supreme
Court should hold is not a question for me as a constitutional law
professor. It is a question for all of us as voters. We are called
upon periodically to make choices that will affect the composition
of the Court-notably, every four years in presidential elections.
In the long run, the Court will reflect the values of America,
whatever those values are. Which is to say that in the end, we'll
get the constitution we deserve.
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